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The Concept of Consciousness 
by 
Joseph Margolis 
The key to the problem of consciousness depends on the obvious fact that 
ascriptions of consciousness are introduced in significantly different, but concept­
ually related ways, with respect to human persons and to creatures of non-human 
species _o_! to humans (infants) at phases of development antecedent to their func­
tioning as fully competent persons. The pivotal fact, however, is a naive and 
simple one: among persons, that is, among ourselves, consciousness is introduced 
with the admission or recognition of a reporting role shared and understood by the 
members of a linguistic community: The very difficulty that one has in stating this 
fact in a non-question-begging way testifies to its fundamental importance. On the 
other hand, consciousness is introduced in speaking of creatures or systems, or of 
creatures or systems at certain phases of development below the level of human 
linguistic ability--or at least recognizably alien to such ability and its manifestations-­
by way of an observer's attempt to explain the behavior and existence of such· 
creatures and systems. Consciousness, therefore, is a theoretical posit of some sort 
with regard to creatures other than human and with regard to the infant phases of 
human life prior to the development of linguistic ability and 'the appearance · of 
actual linguistic performance. It serves an explanatory role with regard to human 
persons as well. But it cannot be introduced in a merely explanatory way, because 
the very effort to explain and understand the sense in which we are conscious en­
tails our being such. We must, in <rur own case, introduce consciousness reflexively, 
that is, as ineliminably. entailed by our ability to report and share our thoughts, per­
ceptions, feelings, intentions, and the like. From this point of view, human persons 
serve as irreplaceable paradigms of what it is to be conscious. Man may not be the 
center of the universe, but he is the center of every effort to understand it. 
To say this·much is, o f  course, not to say what we mean by consciousness. 
It is only to �Y that, in a certain plain sense, we cannot deny consciousness to our­
selves. This is perhaps a way of recovering the Cartesian cogito without the dubious 
and puzzling certainty that Descartes assigned to it; the ascription and ascribability 
of doubt and similar attributes, both reflexively and to others, entails and presup· 
poses, respectively, some form of consciousness. Indeed, the thesis is. tautological. 
It is also vulnerable, in a sense. It is p<>Ssible, for example, to entertain the elimina­
tion of consciousness at both the explanatory and reporting tevels--always recogniz­
ing that explanation, construed as an activity, has a clear. linkage with the reporting 
nse of language. B.F. Skinner's attempt at a radical behaviorism1 sought to elimin· 
ate, at the level of explaining the molar behavior of humans and other organisms, 
all use of mental and intentional predicates (except perhaps as a shortcut for the re· 
placirtg vocabulary). But then, precisely, Skinner may be taken to have intended to 
provide an analysis of consciousness-·in certain non-mental and non-intentional 
ways--rather than to insure its elimination. In a more fundamental way, W.V. Quine 
attempted to sketch the general replacement of the intensional features of inten­
tional discourse by an idiom that behaves fully extensio11ally;2 but there is no sense 
in Quine's program of any need to talk of eliminating mental phenomena--a fortiori, 
consciousness. Wilfrid Sellars attempted to construct an account of persons solely 
in terms of roles somehow added to selected ·aggregates of microtheoretical entities 
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adequate for the explanation of all phenomena. 3 ltere, though he does not elimin­
ate consciousness altogether, Sellars seems to deny the reality of conscious states-­
treats them ascriptiveJy (or "forensically") only. Bolder efforts actually to repud­
iate consciousness and mental states altogether have never been more than program� 
matic. Two of the principal lines of exploration have been sketched by Richard 
Rorty4 and Paul Feyerabend. s But neither has come to grips with the reporting use 
of language6 and with the reporting aspect of efforts at scientific explanation itself. 
In a word, we understand what it would be like to attempt, reductively, to eliminate 
an reference- to consciousness and merital states, but no viable program for their 
actual elimination has as yet surfaced. There is reason to believe- that the difficul­
ties to be overcome are .not merely technical but are. difficulties both of principle 
and of "real time" limitations. 7 
The study 'of consciousness,. then, begins reflexively. This in itself has sur­
prisingly powerful consequences, which we may note very briefly. First of all, it 
can be shown that the analysis of the mental states of animals is inherently anthro­
pomorpbized, since the relevant categ.ories formed for the explanation of animal 
behavior. and existence will be conceptually parasitic. on just those categories that 
johttly facilitate the reporting abilities of human beings and the refiexive explana­
tion of their characteristic behavior. Secondly, it can be shown that, since the para­
�igms of conscious life are supplied by the ability of human persons to report and. 
understand one's thoughts and feelings, all ascriptions of consciousness.and mental 
states are linguistically modeled even for creatures lacking language. This, of 
course, is a corollary of the anthropomorphized nature of animal studies. Thirdly, 
no methocfological skepticism (as distinct from 1error) is possible with regard �o the 
correctness of our description and explanation of animal minds, simply because 
animals that are not linguistically competent share· no reporting function among 
themselves and pursue no efforts at a theoretical understanding of themselves or 
of others. Thomas Nagel's otherwise i-nteresfing query, "What is it like to be a 
bat.?·"8 is, therefore, off the mark. Nagel raised the question in order to throw into 
doubt both a reductive materialism that sought to eliminate interior states of con­
sciousness and ·an anthropocentric aecount of consciousness. tha,t failed to admit 
the possibility of alien forms of life. But Nagel's question is the wrong one, for 
only human persons {on our present views of tlie population of the universe} could 
answer his question. He might have asked, "What is it like to be a dolphin?',. if he 
supposed that we have as yet failed to crack the dolphin language; or, "What is it 
like t.o be a Martian?" which only Martians (on the assumption) could at the pr�sent 
time answei. 
In virtue of these consi4erations, one sees that the theory of consciousness 
is bound to be unified-ranging over humans and animats.--precisely because of the 
methoaological differences between how consciousness is introduced in the human 
context and in the animal� for those differences confirm the priority of reflexive 
characterizations and the analogical extension of relevant predicates to a range of 
creatures lackin� Pt those attributes in virtue of which ascriptions of self-consc;ious­
ness· are possible. In fact, we may in general restrict self-consciousness to 
language-using creatures, that is, to c�tures capable ot reflexive reference 
and reflexive- predication because of their mastery of language. We may perhaps 
allow a certain tolerance here, should it be needed, in the direction of incipient 
ling.uJstic 'ability among chimpanzees, where setf�reference seems quite possible,9 
or even among domesticated dogs, where training seems to invoke responses incip· 
iently like shame and guilt. Seit-consciousness, therefore, is- conceptually linked to 
the admission of a reporting role (or, more.generously, to behavior taken to be func­
tionally equivalent to actual reporting). Consciousness, on the other hand, is attri-
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butable t.o languageless animals on the strength of some advantage of an explanatory 
sort, in virtue of which theories that avoid ·mental states are judged deficient. Hence, 
the admission of ascriptions of consciousness to.animals is tantamount to the rejec­
tion of various forms of reductive materialism. 'Such ascriptions are not so much 
the adoption of a particular theory regarding the explanation of animal life (though 
that, doubtless, is their motivation); they entail rather the adoption of a conceptual 
orientation in which theories of a certain sort (centered on whatever consciousness 
presupposes or entails) will be favored. Speaking loosely, the admission of conscious· 
ness is tantamount to subscribing to a meta-theory or model of alternative theories 
of a certain range, not to any particular theory. The reason for this distinction will 
be pursued very shortly. 
But here, we must detour briefly to preclude several possible sources of mis· 
understanding. Human beings are said to speak natural languages. Ther� is in fact 
no evidence of any human stock that lacks a language (and for every known lang­
·uage, there are bilinguals). By a natural language, we understand a determinate lang­
uage that is learned in infancy through interaction wi�h the members of a society 
who actually use that language in their own transactions.1 0 However quarrelsome 
his speculations about an innate grammar may be, even Noam Chomsky does uot 
deny that· one cannot speak merely in accord with his linguistic universals; one 
must actually learn a culturally determinate language--with respect to which, on 
Chomsky's theory, our innate linguistic competence manifests itself in terms of 
linguistic performance. Now, it is quite possible that a machine be programmed to 
perform linguistically. One can imagine for instance very sophisticated programs 
being used by the telephone company to "answer" questions about subscribers' 
numbers and the like.11 It is, therefore, quite possible to extenc;i the use of terms 
Uke "speak;'' "inform," ·�give information about.'' "answer,'' "tell," and the like, 
in virtue of which we would be willing to say of a machine that it spoke though it 
wa; not capable of consciousness or conscious states. In the human case, the concep­
tual linkage bet�een speech and consciousness cannot be broken, because the hu­
man being learns a natural language and uses it re�ly in just those ways that, 
paradigmatically, manifest consciousness. It is because machines (on tile hypothesis) 
do not learn language "naturally" from some prelinguistic condition (though they 
may be said to "learn" to use their language more effectively, with sustaiqed use) 
that� can entertain the prospect of extending the application of predicates regard­
ing the use of language independen�ly of the application of predicates regarding the 
manifestion of consciousness. It remains true, nevertheless, that the language imput­
ed to such machines is a language, only on the recognition or interpretftion of some 
human person. So the ascription of linguistic ability to machines is itself concept· 
ually dependent on the admission of a natural language. Furtherrnqre, this concept­
ual. dependence affects every effort we may make to read back, on the.strength of 
machine performance, some interpretation of human performance. The notions of 
intentionality and information, for instance, are, in the relevant sense, first intro­
duce.d in the human context and then applied .(in different ways) to animals and 
machines. There is no way known in which it could coherently be claimed that 
such notion·s may be defined first for machine's and then applied to humans. 
We see,. therefore, that ·if we treat persons as creatures or �ystems capable of 
using language (and of whatever abilities that ability facilitates), 12 artificial persons 
need not (so far forth). be conscious, though they may be; but natural persons can­
n<t but be oonscious. 1he least reflection, however, shows thlt related distinctions wiD. 
be required with respect to the concept of learning itself. "Learning" is an extreme­
ly elastic term;. often appUed to chess-playing machines, for instance, that are 
5 
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thought not to be conscious; or even to paramecia, whose "behavior,, appears to 
be subject to conditioning-of such an extraordinary sort that the putative "meroory,, 
of trained paramecia can be passed on to other untrained specimens merely by in· 
gesting the ground-up remains of their prede�essors! But again, since linguistically 
incompetent animals are ascribed consciousness only at the level of our explana­
tions of their particular form of life, it is entirely possible that the predicate "learn­
ing" and similar predicates may be extended to range over phenomena in which no 
assumptions of consciousness obtain. ThrS'Seems, for instance, to be intended (with 
some tendentiousness and conceptual uneasiness, it should be said) by the etholo­
gists.1 3.- We may also notice that, on the argument a�vanced, there need be no. in· 
compatibility between characterizing a system as an autof!1aton and as conscious. 
Normally, because of the nature of actual machines and actual persons and animals, 
we are inclined to believe that the one excludes the other. But it is not conceivable 
"(even if it is false) that human life should ultimately be explained on the basis of 
autorn$n theory; and it is quite conceivable that the complexity of future 
machines ma.y iustify the ascription of consciousness..14 
It must also be emphasized that, since the ascription of consciousness among 
huinan persons.is reflexively based on the reportorial capacities of humans, it is to 
be realistically construed. That is, human persons actually possess the attributes of 
speaking and thinking and the like. No ontology that admits our initial concession 
regarding the dual nature of ascriptions of consciousness could consistently deny 
the reality of mental states-·unless some ulterior form of eliminative materialism 
(or surrogate) could be vindicated. Realism with regard to mental states is, then, at 
least conditionally favored. On the other hand, with respect t.o animals and machines, 
it is quite possiWe to preserve an option between realist and heuristic ascriptions 
of consciousness and mental states. The issue is rather more complicated than may 
appear by positing just this contrast, and we shall 'Clarify some o f  its aspects shortly. 
By "heuristic," we here mean that the ascriptions are not realistic; the systems 
involved do not really or actually or literally have the properties ascribed; only by 
a fa�on de parler, a metaphor or analogy, or convenience of reference, do we iden­
tify the actual properties involved as if they were genuine forms of consciousness. 
On this view, by definition, a natural person (that is, a linguisticatly able system 
that has learned a natural language as a natural language) must actually be conscious 
and possess determinate mental states. This is why, for instance, Sellars' forensic 
solution of the ontic status of linguistically informed mental states of (human) 
persons is untenable. To admit th� forms of language is to admit the actual psycho­
logical capacities of human beings to perform linguistically. 
Nevertheless, although animals lacking language can (on the sketch of the 
theory here advanced) be ascribed consciousness and mental states only in a way 
that is linguistically modeled, we are not thereby driven to hold that those ascrip­
tions are merely heuristic. On the contrary> it is entirely reasonable to claim that at 
least the higher mammals actually possess mental states of some sort. The form of 
the ascription of mental states to animals is heuristic, in the sense, precisely, that 
the ascriptions are linguistically modeled; but the mental states themselves are real­
istically attributed to the higher animals. This is simply the consequence of the way 
in which we have answered Nagel,..s question. We alone make ascriptions of con· 
:sciousn� to the bat (if we choose to).15 Doing so, we depend on analogies drawn 
between non-linguistically informed behavior of }?ats. and the linguistically informed 
behavior of persons, and we model the ascripti()ns of the one on what is literally 
true of the other. Thus, ignoring for the time being the complications that result 
from making such ascriptions to animals--particularly with-respect to puzzles about 
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intensionality / 6 --th.e ascriptio�s may be realistically affirmed though heuristically 
modeled. There need be no contradiction in this. In fact, it is required if animal 
psychology be admissib:le at all. It should perhaps be mentioned, fn all fairness, that 
there have been attempts to model the mental states of animals and humans non­
linguistically. Bl.it these--notably, for instance, D.M. Armstrong's effortl 7 --have been 
obliged to introduce notions like "concepts" and "ideas," wh-ich, it may be argued, 
can be shown not to have eliminated at all an essential appeal· to a linguistic model. 
(We shall return to the issue.) In any case, these considerations are sufficient to dis· 
miss Daniel Dennett's claim that "a particular thiRg is an intentional system only in 
relation to the strategies of someone who is trying to explain and predict its behav­
ior." 18 First of all, Dennett constnles intentionality in a pu£ely heuristic way." But 
realism with respect to the mental states of languageless animals is- at least eligibfe, 
if not welH1igh impossible to �eny; also, the mental states of humans cannot all be 
construed in terms of (linguistically informed) explanatory efforts. Secondly, Den· 
nett confuses inten!_ionality with inten§ionality, holding that the former (in Bren­
tano?s sense) '�is primarily a feature of linguistic entities--idioms, contexts;" in fact, 
he equates the two notions.1 9 · 
· Now, it is also conceiivable that our very moder of linguistic reporting and 
our explanation of the meptal life of languageless animals betray us in some sense-· 
almost "ideolGgically"-·into think.tng· that the phenomena of either ·or both animal 
and human life are correctly analyzed in terms o f  that model. For example, both 
ways of speaking emphasize the molar uafty of the agent of speech and mental 
states, and this may be· construed as the result of an understandable bias of a cer­
tain reflexive habit
-
. Some theorists (notably, structuralists like Claude· Levi-Strauss) 
actually seem to hold that the underlying structures of human existence are some­
how "there" in the external world--independent of the molar bias and psychologi­
cal capacities of reflexively competent human agents--in spite of the fact th.at those 
structures are themselves distinctly intentional in nature.20 There is reason, there­
fore,. to think -that such an approach is eit.her ultimately incoherent or else an ex­
tremely attenuated (and somewhat irrelevant) form of caution regarding the finality 
of any explanatory scheme {including Levi-Strauss') or regarding the inescapability 
of yielding �o the tendentious historical currents of one's own time. 21 If so, it may 
be safely dismissed. The point of mentioning it, h<?wever, is to suggest a certain 
closure regarding our question, since ·we should then have c�nsidered both infra. 
and suera-human alternatives to the central role of the mental states of human 
persons. 
It is also possible to. attempt to replace the molar agents of speech and mental 
states with a community of "sub-personal" homunculi, rather in the manner in 
which Dennett· has worked. 2 2 But, apart from the difficulties of explaining how 
the apparently molar person, or agent, is completely replaced', without remainder, 
by such a molecular community, the characterization of such homun�uli is quite 
explicitly and frankly dependent on the idiom suited to the reporting role Qf human 
persons. Certain entities, it is true--thoughts and pains ·and the like--are denied act­
ual existence; but that is hardly equivalent to denying that the having of certain 
attributes really obtains at the personal level. Only if persons themselves are re.plac­
ed by molecular homunculi, can the realist ascription to persons (of mental states 
and consciousness) be denied; but then, the question remains whether, with what­
ever adjustment may be required, ascriptions to the members of the molecular 
community wilt not, in their tum, be tantamount to the admissi.on of consciousness 
and mental states. The matter will have to be considered more carefully. In any case, 
the structuralist alternative threatens to remain a mystery, since the very conditions 
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on which its validity depends seem, on the theory, to be inaccessible. And Dennett's 
alternative is one whose force depends on appraisjng just how successfully it can 
replace the intuitively famil_iar model of. persons and of other molar cognitive agents. 
We should, therefore, tum to consider what it is we claim in claiming .that a system 
is conscious. 
What we have; in effect, already conceded is that at least a very large range of 
attributions normally reserved for conscious persons and conscious animals may, 
without conceptual difficulty, be ascribed to machines that are not thought to be 
conscious. We have conceded that this holds, for instance, for predicates regarding 
speech, providing information, responding to questions; and also, for learning, aa­
quisltion of information, and adjustmerits in behavior dependent on learning and 
new information. It looks as if a similar extension could be justified for all the 
\!erbs of propositionai attitude: machines are said to calculate, to solve, to decide, 
to test; to conjecture, and the like. Possibly the single recalcitrant range o·f predi­
cates in which, barring consciousness, we should not be inclined to permit the ex­
tension covers bodily · sensations, mental images, "raw feels," and the like. These 
are notoriously slighted in Gilbert Ryle's attempt to segregate the "categories" of 
mental and the physical, so as to preclude interactien.23 They are also stressed in 
Herbert Feigl's notable effort to vindicate some form of reductive materialism, as 
providing· the most· difficult conceptual barrier to any reductive ·program. 2 4 They 
are also said to be able to be similated in a functional or informational sense by 
machine systems that actually lack such phenomenal episodes. 25 And, most recent­
ly, they have been reaffirmed (without argument, it must be said), by Karl Popper 
and John Eccles, as obliging us to return to a Cartesian dualism or a dualism of 
some as yet unspecified. form more or less hospitable to Cartesianism..26 
There 1.s a clear·sen!ie in which, for instance, the having of pain is inadmissable 
except on the assumption of consciousness. Much the same seems to. be true of 
ascriptions of images, raw feels, and the like .. If the argument rested with such 
ascriptions only, the matter would be rather. quickly resolved, though what the 
proper analysis of such phenomena might be would still remain an issue of some 
contention. The trouble is that (i) the ascription of the relevant ·phenomenal states 
is paradigmatically managed by way of the reflexive reporting ability of human 
persons; and (ii) it may well be conceptually possible (and even empiri�lly viable) 
that. organisms or systems be (and be judged) to be conscious, though they lack all 
such phenomenal states. Hence, bodily sepsations and the like are inextricably 
linked, in a conceptual way, with ascriptions of states of consciousness that need 
not be characterized by means of any· similar phenomenal predicates; and the 
phenomena themselves are not demonstrably n·ecessary to systems said to exhibit 
·consciousness. Hence, disputes about internal phenomenal states are, largely, rather 
inaptly linked to the issue of analyzing the nature of consciousness.itself. 
These considerations confirm that ascriptions· of consciousness cannot con­
vincingly 'be grounded by means of the use of any :particular mental predicate: 
the�e is, in every individual: case, the risk ·of an extended or attenuated or meta­
phorical or functionally equivalent use that actually precludes, or ignores, con­
sciousness. The only reasonable supportive strategy, under the circumstances, is to 
link ascriptions of consciousness to the use of a system of related predicates under 
at least certain ·empirically assignable conditions. That system must apply initially 
to the· reportorial performances of ·human persons and must be. entailed in the 
explanation· of language less creatures said to be conscious. The properties of such a 
system are oo distinctive that invoking it at the explanatory level may. be ·seen at onre 
to challenge the usual forms· of reductive materialism. We must, theref9re, for the 
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sake of a fair presentation, consider in turn: (a} the conceptual . features of the 
system; (b) the methodological defense of invoking such a system; an.d (c) the em­
pirical criteria on which such a system is actually invoked. 
· · We have neutralized the extension of the relevant predicates to nonconscious 
machines by noticing that their use with respect to machines requires an interpreta­
tion on the part of fully conscious persons., This is not simply because all ascriptiQns 
are made by conscious persons; on the contrary, we have conceded that .they may 
be made by machines as well. It is rather because the extension of the relevant pred­
icates entails ..a comparison between applying them to �oncons�ious systems and to 
the paradigmatic conscious instances that are ourselves .. Ascriptions of mental states, 
therefore, need not be coextensive with ascriptions of consciousness, but they are 
conceptually dependent on · ascriptions of consciousness nevertheless. For, first of 
all, mental ascriptions are initially made of human persons capable of reporting 
and explaining their own mental states, whidl, paradigmaticaily, manifest what we mean 
by �iousne95." Seoondly, oors=ious mental states are theoretimlly asa-ibed to animals and hu­
man infants (at least initially) by human persons, on the grounds· of explana­
tory advantage, in spite of their lack of language. Thirdly, mental states, or analo­
gues of mental states, are ascribed by extension to noncol')scious machines-:again 
by human persons gauging functional similarities between man and Jtiachfoes. And 
finally, i.mconsciou·s mental states are ascribable only to systems capabl_e in principle 
of conscious mental states. But, as we have already noted, the system of predicates 
to be applied to human persons, languageless animals, and prelinguistlc. infants will 
be ·essentially the same--with due provision for the differences rioted. Once we grant 
this mu ch, we may concede as well that the system will, by extended tise,'be appli­
ca.ble also to certain nonconscious machines. Hence, we must distinguish carefully 
between feat'ures of the system necessary for ascriptions of consciousriess (though 
not suffi.cient) and those features $hat serve as criteria for the actual ascription of 
consciousness itself. There is a characteristic informality about the latter. 
. Tlie most salient--per�aps the most inclusive--n�ce�sary, condition for. ascrip· 
tions of consciousness may be titled rationality. By rationality, we mean a model . . 
of the coherence that must hold among the internal mental state� of a system a_n.d 
its behavior. Here, a considerable number of distinctions are called for. For ins­
taric�, we must sort out neste� schemata . of rationality. invoked in . �11kiI).g ascrip· 
tions to human persons, that range frpm the most generous species-specific charac­
teristics to more determinate, historically plural, cultural specifications to even 
more determinate, idiosyncratic, and highly vari�ble persQnal specifications. The 
·rationality of living creatures varies from species. to spe.cies; but only in the case of 
human· persons will t�ere appear as well a wide range of alternative 'schemata of 
cultural, sub-cultural, and . personal models of rationality. The most gene�ic, essen­
tially determinable constraints concern interr�lationships among such elements as 
�ants, d�sires, beliefs, perceptions, intentions, anc;I actiqns. Thus, a�cribirig .an in· 
te.ntion. to a human agent normally entails ascriJ;>ing a belief that. what is intended 
does not yet obtain and that what Is intended falls within the agent's power to 
achieve. Again, ascriptions of desires or wants normally entail ascribing a gen�ral 
cqngruence between intentions and actions, informed by interv�ning' perceptions 
�d beliefs, and such desires or wants. In short, tlie ascription of mental states and 
consciousness conforms with the viability of the species; the P.a�tern of ascription 
is basically the same for humans and for creatures of other species, except that the 
mode of life' of the different species varies. Thus that the great cats are carnivo1es 
must be built into our picture of the �pecies-specific rationalit� of such creatu�es. 
In the human case, our schema normally accommodates some selection of the so· 
9 
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called prudential interests pf man, which bridge the animal and personal interests 
of humai:i beings. 2 7 
One .important consequence of admitting a species-specific model of ration· 
ality .is that it becomes logically impossible to ascribe a particular mental state or 
cogRitively informed action without invoking the model in support of other suit· 
ably congruent ascriptions of mental states and actions..  Random members of a 
species <:annot be said to perceive-, for instance, unless they can also be said to 
want or desire, and to abe able to ad, or to intend to try to act, in accord w:it 
want or desire, and to be able to act, or to intend to try to act, in accord with 
their wants, or desires, and their perceptions and beliefs. Variations and idiosyl'\· 
cratic iimttations may appear in the lives of particular individuals {for instance, 
a.Mong the insane), but the model is invok�d to explain the viability of the species 
itself. In short, the ascription of particular mental states and particular actions is 
intelligihl� only on the assumption that they fit. congruently among an entire net· 
work of rel.ated states and actions. There are no atomic perceptions or beliefs. To 
determine .tha� a mental state or psychologically informed action obtains is to view 
the tif e of an organism under the model of some �uita-bly species-specific rational· 
ity. Rationality, therefore, presu�poses (and, on an explanatory theory, se:r.vices) the 
biological viability of a species. (It may also, of course, be construed analogically 
with respect to the functioning of a machine.) Here, then, is the methodological 
motivation for introducing rationality: it is an inference to the best model, or 
scheme, of explanation for given species, not merely an inference to determinate 
explanations. under sU<:h a model. 
Another consequence is that the irrationaiity of individual behavior pre· 
supposes, and falls within the range of, the minimal rationality of the species. The 
model requires only a characteristic congruence among belief, desire, action, and the 
rest. Particul8l episodes may well be defective; but to think or behave irrationally 
is to think or to act··Which presupposes the minimal, species-specific competen.ce 
or rationality of the stock .. The problem arises primarHy--perhaps nearly exclusively 
··among human beings. Consequently, there is a strong temptation to cortstrue 
rationality in the human c·ontext as conformity to some determinate ideology or 
doctrine. A particularly obvious illustration is afforded in a recent account by Philip 
Pettit of so-called "rational man theory." Pettit confuses the general rationality of 
man with adherence to the constraints of decision theory. For instance, he holds 
that "Every human action springs from a desire or set of desires which, in view of 
the agent's beliefs, it promises to satisfy" .. where "satisfy" is defined in accord with 
the thesis that "Beliefs and desires lead to action by familiar rational principles 
which it is the job of decision theory to spell out."28 Others may equate rationality 
with utilitarian calculation. 2 9 A Kantian would insist that rationality entails con· 
formity with the Categorical Imperative. But the exposure of ideology as a sort of 
pretended objective constraint on rationality3 o- does not yet bear on the grounds 
for favoring explanations in terms of the coherence of mental states and actions·· 
over those that do not introduce such states and actions at all. In short, there is no 
model of mental states and actions that does not provide for the characteristic co­
herence that holds among relevant ascriptions; but to concede that is to concede a 
model of species-specific rationality. To perceive, for in.stance, is to make a discrim· 
inati.on of some kind suitable for guiding action with respect to intefest and desire. 
Putatively isolated perceptions utterly unrelated to desire and actiion would have no 
place in promoting the viability of the species--and would be unrecognizable, being 
linked to no empirically detectable advantage. It is in our effort to understand the 
survival of the mode of life of given species that we first postulate mental states. 
A third consequence of our model js that mental states and actions, and their 
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congruity, are ascribable at the molar level of organismic life (or at the comparable 
level for machines), not at any molecular level--that is, not at any level at which a 
sub-system of a person or sentient animal is designated-·unless derivatively from 
molar ascriptions themselves. Persons think, feel, perceive, believe, and act--not 
their brains or sequences of neurophysiological processes. Here, the condition of 
rationality--necessary for consciousness itself--must be viewed in terms of intention­
ality, or information. Despite the uncerlainties of Franz Brentano•s recovery of the 
concept of intentionality. 3 1 a number of pertinent generalizations may be offered 
about its use. Intentionality is a sufficient mark either of the mental or psycho­
logical or of what may be done QI made by psychologically endowed agents. For 
instal'lce, machines and artworks exhibit intentionality merely as the products of 
hwnan work and behavior, in spite of (normally) lacking mental states themselves.32 
Secondly , wherever psychological states are cognitively construed, their intentional 
characterization requires propositional objects at least. Thus, to perceive (in the 
cognitive sense), or to believe, is to perceive, or believe,ib.at..Q, even if nonproposi­
tional objects may also be correctly ascribed. In accord with the reflexive paradigm 
of human· mental life, one may report that one perceives, or believes, this or that; 
and our theory of the intellfgibility of such reporting requires that what is report­
able in first-person contexts is, in a public way, at least in general, ascribable in 
third-person contexts as well . .  1 3  
The propositiona� content of human perception and belief is, in being re­
portable, directly conveyed by suitably selected sentences: §. sees, and reports that 
l'le sees, that there is a horse on the hill. The propositional content of his perception 
and belief is linguislically modeled; bttt ·to perceive and believe is not necessarily 
to exercise any linguistic ability or to be disposed to. Insofar as any creature or 
system is ascribed cognitively qualified states, propositional content must be assign­
ed such states. This is, in faGt, the 9nly way in which the detailed rationality of cog­
nitively competent systems is articulated. tfence, .if the higher animals at least are 
supposed to perceive or desire, or to act in a way that is informed by perception-­
in any sense that is cognitively apt--then it is impossible to avoid ascribing proposi· 
tionally qualified mental -states to such creatures, with respect to which a suitable 
species-specific rationality gbtains-. Propositions we may treat as heuristic entities 
(in the sense already provided); but the propositiona� content of the mental states 
of animals is only heuristically modeled (though- those states are real enough) on 
the- reporting practice of reflexive, self-conscious human persons. This goes entirely 
contrary te those theorists who wish to concede that animals are aware of pain and 
perception but who deny that they are capable of belief or of any form of think­
ing. 3 4 On the thesis here developed, such a claim- is incoherent. The very idea that 
a lion sees an eland in a cognitively relevant way signifies that (roughly) his seeing 
that an eland is near is a discrimination pertinently link_ed to his charaeteristic 
appetite and behavi..>l (that are similarly propositionally informed). Such proposi­
tional ascriptions are functionally assigned on the assumption that the explanation 
of the lion's beha'l.ior requires a model of species-specific rationality. The proposi­
tional content assigned is an artifact of the explanatory theory. In invoking the 
theory, however, for the sake of the most effect�ve expla.nation, we cann�t av<?id 
attributing propositional content to the �ental states of the creatures or systems 
involved; also, on a realist theory of scientific explanation, we must suppose that 
languageless animals do possess mental states--and on our best interpretation, those 
states must exhibit intentionality or 0aboutness." 
It is helpful to note that the puzzles of intensional contexts that affect our 
analysis of human mental statesJ 5 do not affect in the same way our discourse 
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about the mental states of animals. The reason is .elementary: animals lack language, 
and intensionality is a property of linguistic systems.36 We must, in working out 
the species-specific model . of rationality appropriate to creatures of different kinds, 
decide what conceptual limitations and discriminations best characterize one species 
or another. Mice and pigeons are known to be capable of discriminating certain 
perceptual fo�s. The beha_vior of dogs stJpports .the thesis that, functionally, a dog 
can discriminate the presence of Its master; but, even if a dog's master is the mayor 
of Philadelphia1 there is no reason to think that it can distinguish as such .the mayor 
of Philadelphia. Hence, certain intensional constraints are imposed on the cognitive 
capacities of animals, by way of specifying the concepts that they can "work" with; 
but languageless animals are not, on the hypothesis, capable of whatever intensio'?al 
distinctions presuP.pose linguistic ability itself. In short, the imposition of a model 
of ratio'nality entails asc�pt�ons of propositional content to a range of mental �tates; 
but such ascriptioQs, relative to species·specific rationality, are constrained by im­
puted conceptual limitations appropriate to the species. Hence, (i) contra Arm­
strong, the very admission of concepts is tantamount to the adoption of a strategy 
of linguistic modeling: and (ii) like propositions (with which they are inextricably 
bound), concepts may be construed as heuristic entities, invoked solely for pur­
poses of convenience of explanation. 
!Vh�t we &ee, then, is that the entire apparatus of rationality and proposition­
ally qualified . mental states is invoked to explain the life of organisms and si:r"'lilar 
molar systems. The congruenc;e that must hold if ascriptions of rationality have any 
point holds initially amon_g the' actions and varjous states of mind of persons and 
animals. Paradigmatically • .it holds of persons capable of reflexive reporting; on a 
favorable theory e.ntertained by persons, it may be.extended to animals whose func­
tional life appears suitably similar to the i"ife that human beings can report. Informa­
tion, fro111 this pqint of view--not in the sense of communication theory3 7 --is inten­
tional in nature. It cannot be as�ribed at any molecular level within an organismic 
or mola� system, unless derivatively. Dennett sum�arizes the issue rather neatly: 
"the information or content an event [has] within the system [it has] for the sys­
tem as a (biological) whole. ,,3 8 The idea is that it is at least the members of di ff er­
ent animal species, or hµman persons, who exhibit rationally. ordered mental states 
and behavior--intentionality and the possession or processing of information or 
propositions. .Hence, it is to them as well · that we first as�ribe consciousness. 
By analogy with what we have already said. however. it is entirely possible 
to �xtend the use of the concept of rationality--or to use it figuratively or heuris­
tically--among lower animals (conceivably even among plants, certainly among 
machines), to which we should deny mental stat�s. What this amounts to is con­
structing the relatively invariant "r�sponsiveness" Of such creatures as, for instance, 
the tick,39 as exhibiting. by a fa)On de parler, a for� of �tionality comparable with 
that of creatures capable of cognitively qualified mental states. In short, there is a 
conceptually ordered· declension of ascriptions from the fully cognitive to the func­
tional or teleological that utterly lacks cognitive qualification. 4 0 At the level of 
human persons, we concede the paradigm of mental states and actions that are (a) 
c9nscious, (b) ·rationa�ly interrelated, (c) cognitively qualified, and (d) linguistic­
ally informed. At the lev�l of the higher animals, we are prepared to admit mental 
states possessing attributes (a)-(c), where the ascriptions are .t hemselves anthro­
pomorphized in the manner described. Such systems are said (as by Charl�s Taylor) 
to be fully purposive--and intentional. By various �strictions on these. attributes, 
we may distinguish alternative functional systems. For example, because machines 
are actually programmed by human persons, they may, as artifacts, be said to 
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exhibit a characteristic form of rationality. This is simply te say that, on a �uman 
interpretation, machines may be ascribed--with or without consciousness--mental, 
even cognitive states. Whether or not this must be a mere fa�n cte parter, it involves 
(at least at the present stage of our technology) a noticeable extension of the rele­
vant attributes well beyond the range of our human paradigms, in· the absence of 
biological anaf ogy. To avoid misunderstanding, such systems may be .termed arti­
factual (if purposive), so as to emphasize the- conceptual dependence of relevant 
ascriptions on the originating purposes of human bein'gs--which, of course, is not to 
deny that machines may tntroduce propositionally significant innovations that no 
human agent could achieve in real time. Alternatively put, they are artifact.ual 
though purposive: all ascriptions of rationality and of intentional states are com· 
pletely borrowed, therefore, from their human makers. In facf, we also speak thus 
where w� mean to deny mental or conscious. or cognitive states--for example, in 
speaking of ·a thermostat, where the intentional idiom is purery figurattve. 
This is emphatically not true of the higher animals, regarding which only the 
form of ascription, not the r�al states ascribed, is borrowed. In the case of the lower 
animals, either (a) and (c) are coextensive ranges, not in the sense that every ins­
tance of sentience is cognitively informed (which is not even true of humans), but 
in the sense that every mode of sentienee provides occasions of cognition; or, non­
cognitive forms of sentience (or at least irritatibility of some sort) may be conced­
ed that functionally resemble the rational organization of conscious mental states. 
Such systems are said (as by Taylor, to be teleological rather than purposive; the 
ascription to such systems of ptopositionally quatified states, or of any form of 
intentionality, is a mere fa�n de parler. Teleological"ascriptions re�emb-le purposive, 
or psychologically informed, ascriptions because they are also holistic and because 
they appear to. require peculiar lawlike ,relations linking processes and some end· 
state that governs such processes. Whether, in fact, tlie teleological can be replaced 
by nonteleological causal regularit(es we need not here examine.4 I But teleological 
explanation--for instance,_ as in homeostatic systems--normally exploits a model of 
information processing. Either the practice employs a mere f�n de parler (where 
non-teleological explanation is adequate�, as in the case of the thermostat; or the 
model is invoked heuristically, by analogy with machines, because, as perhaps in 
the case of plants and lower animals, we are unable as y�t to explain the relevant 
phenomena otherwise. We inrtrodµce the purposive modet heuristically, for the sake, 
say, of predicting the behavfor of a system (say a chess--playing machine, or a plant 
in difficult terrain), without -making &ny assumptit')ns about the details of its physi­
cal organization and without imputing to it mental states realistically. The peculiar­
ity of the ascription of information processing, for ins.tance, at the level of DNA.,42 
is simply that information in the relevant sense is propositionally quaiified and as­
clibed to systems incapable of conscious., psychological, or cognitive states. In that 
sense, it must be entirely an artifact of our explanatory efforts. 
We are now in a position to say what we mean· by consciousness. Conscious­
ness is· (1) the state of any paradigm system capable of using language or of ·influ­
encing bP.havior by internal states that that system can report; and (2) the state of 
ar.y non-paradigm · system that is suitably analogous t<> the relevant states of para­
digm systems. This will seem an outrageously simpte (and therefore, doubtles.s, 
false) account. But it is surRrisingiy sup,ple and plausible, and it can be shown to 
avoid certain serious difficulties that other contenders cannot readily manage. Den­
nett, for example, divides the concept of consciousness thus: 
(1) A is aware1 that ..P. at time JJf and only if _p_is the content of the 
input state of A's "speech center" at time.!: 
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(2) A is aware2 that J!.. at time i_ if and only if_£. is the content of an 
internal event in A at time t that is effective in directing current 
behavior.43 
- - � 
His intention is to distinguish between reference to "privileged access" (awareness1) 
and reference to "control" {awarene�). He is persuaded that the· two notions 
"wrongly coalesce in our intuitive grasp of what it is to be conscious of some­
thing. "44But there are certain obvious difficulties with his definitions. First of all, 
(1) and (2) may be satisfied by syst�ms that are not conscious--if we grant what 
has already been said about the extension of predicates to machines. 4 .:i Secondly, 
the condition that.£. (that is, some proposition) be the content of �s speech center, 
or effective in controlling behavior, is intelligible only on the grounds that .£ may 
(or some _q to wh1ch ..E. is dependently linked) be suitably assigned as the content of 
some mental state; but, on the argument already presented, this cannot be defend­
ed unless A is a paradigm of a conscious system, or a system ascribed mental states 
by suitable analogy with such a paradigm. Hence, Dennett's account is either cir­
cular or questioribegging. Thirdly, the assignment of _.Q. as the relevant con tent of 
some internal state or internal event is intended by Dennett to apply to the parts 
of A rather than to A itself; but, on our argument (and Dennett's own, as cited 
above), the content or information assigned to an int�rnal event within, or state of 
an internal part of, a system must "be understood as a function of the function 
within the whole system of that event (or sta'ie ) . "4 6 In short, assignments of prop­
ositional co·ntent to the molecular subsystems of persons or sentient animals is 
intelligible .only if such assignments are conceptually related to assignments made 
to the relevant molar systems themselves. 
Dennett seems to agree with this. But his own reductive program requires that 
he analyze "a person into an organization of subsystems (organs, routines, nerves, 
faculties, components--even atoms) and [attempt] to explain the behavior of the 
whole person as the outcome of the interaction of these subsystems."4 7 Again, 
there are difficulties. For on.e thing, his a.nalytic program violates the principle that 
(i.n the relevant sense) the function of a subsystem of a person is assignable only as 
the subfunction of the characteristic functioning of a molar person. Secondly, the 
program presupposes, bu't does not demonstrate. that the functioning of a person is 
not emergent in the senses attacked, for instance, for alternative reductive reasons, 
by Herbert Feigi and Mario Bunge:48 for, if it were, then the functionalist, and 
the cognitivist, analytic program would be doomed.49 The instructive error of 
Dennett's undertaking is that he confuses the subfunctions of a person's (or ani­
mal's) conscious functioning with the functioning of the sub-personal parts of a 
person or animal--into which that person or animal may be completely analyzed. 
The sub-functions of person's functioning may be assigned infor.mational or prop­
ositional content on the condition that appropriate content be assigned to the men­
tal states of that person. But a person cannot be eliminated in favor of a commun­
ity of molecular homunculi, or sub-personal parts, for at least two reasons: (a) the 
ascription o! propositional content to the parts has no empirical basis except in 
terms of analyzing the sub-functioning ingredients within the conscious function­
ing of the molar system; and (b) the ascription of information or propositional 
content to th.e parts is an ascription of content inaccessible to the molar system. 
�nnett himSelf says: "We have no direct personal access to the structure of -cori­
tentful events within us. "5 0 In effect, Dennett's model needs to include (against its 
own purpose) a relationship between sub-per:;onal homunculi (speaking their own 
language, so to say) and the molar person, who, one way or another, must be ih-
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formed in his own idiom of what they say. But this is tantamount to admitting that 
there is no foreseeable stra�egy by which to eliminate molar persons and .animals 
that (in a non.reductive sense) are cons�ious. There can be no reduction of persons 
to sub-personal parts (of any sort) since sub-personal parts are such only relative to 
the molar system of which they are the parts: their "information" is nothing but 
what is parceled out, on a theory' as ingredient in the information, or intentional 
content, of what may be independently and antecedently ascribed to the mental 
states of molar persons. The reduction would be possible only if intentional states 
could be identified with, or replaced by, non-intentional states; or if "information" 
adequate to explain the behavior of a. molar system could be assigned independent· 
Jy to molecular parts without regard to intentional ascriptions made to the molar 
system itself. Dennett rejects the first as false to the facts, and rejects the second as 
incoherent. He has, therefore, undermined the very basis for his own proposal. 
These considerations show the resilience of our definition of consciousness. 
The life of paradigm systems--of human. persons··exhibits· as such the complexity, 
the variability, the novelty, the range, the versatility, the creativity of what we 
mean by consciousness. Application of the notion to languageless animals depends 
empirically, on a suitably favorable range of behavior on the part of such animals 
that requires, for its explanation, appeal to a model of rationality similar ·to that 
which applies to human betngs. Hence, it makes no difference in principle where we 
draw the cutting line between consciousness and its absence--among languageless 
creatures. It does not depend, there, on a genuine reporting role; it is invoked solely 
at the explanatory level (though it may be invoked realistically)--for instance, in 
explaining the peculiarly inventive swimming play of the cetaceans. 5 1 Conversely, 
we dampen, for related reasons, the need to invoke consciousness in explaining the 
behavior of ticks. 
· 
Consciousness, then, is empirically ascribed to persons in terms of their char­
acteristic forms of linguistic exchange, and of the mental states imputed to them 
that influence their behavior and that they are able to report; by extension, it is 
empirically ascribed to animals whose mode of communication and behavior is 
sufficiently complex, versatile, inventive, and the like, that it bears favorably com· 
parison with human paradigms. Such ascriptions to such animals depend essentially 
on our inability to work in an explanatory way without a full-fledge.d model of 
rationality. But such ascriptions are not, for that reason, merely heuristic. On the 
other hand, in understanding ticks, though we may not need to ascribe conscious· 
ness in order to understand and predict the details of their form of life, it is quite 
possible that a heuristic US? of the same model may still remain the most convenient, 
effective, and accurately predictive instrument to guide our· speculations. In the 
latter case, it remains a fa�n de parter though it has its (heuristic) predictive use; in 
the former, it remains re istic, though it is invoked on the strength of explanatory 
advantage. Explanations of the life of persons, then, require reference to whatever 
properly affects persons in their cultural milieu--notably, ·the reasons that they 
consciously hold that influence them to �t as th�y do. 5 2 It is trt.Je that these 
accounts must be supplemented by attention to processes that operate at molecular 
levels within persons--in terms, for instance, of perception, inference, memory stor­
age, retrieval, and the like. But causal factors at such levels, insQfar as they are assig­
ned informational or intentional content; are assigned such content only congruent· 
ly with whatever may be ascrib�d within the repertory of mental states assignable 
to molar persons. This at least is· what is required if persons and their linguistically 
informed mental states are genuinely emergent phenomena. For here, two essential 
constraints must be conceded. In the first place. intentional "content � be 
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described,"5 3 only-assigned, on a model of rationality, to appropriate systems. And 
in the second, there is no known way in principle to replace our intentional .models 
(once introduced) by non-intentional ones.H But the paradigm application of in­
tentional models is the conscious life of human persons. 
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